By Rev. Deacon Nicholas Denysenko
When the Ecumenical Patriarchate (EP) granted autocephaly to the Orthodox Church in Ukraine (OCU) early in 2019, the partially unified church confronted a series of new challenges. The Orthodox media focused on the political dimensions of the ever-evolving situation in Ukraine, closely monitoring the number of parishes that announced a change in their affiliation. Orthodox synods and clergy debated the canonical legitimacy of the ordinations of most of the OCU’s bishops and clergy. Many observers expressed outrage and concern about persecution of the Moscow Patriarchate in Ukraine (UOC-MP). Leaders waited for one of the sister Churches to announce a definitive response to the situation in Ukraine, with many hoping that the mission of Archbishop Chrysostomos of Cyprus would resolve the matter peacefully and permanently.
From the very beginning of its existence, leaders of the OCU stated that preserving the unity of the Church was their top priority. Few observers paid attention to the possibility of tumult within the OCU, given the weight of the other issues mentioned above. However, insiders knew that good pastoral leadership was needed to overcome tensions among the bishops of the newly-unified church. After all, the OCU consisted primarily of bishops from the former Kyivan Patriarchate (KP) and Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC), two bodies that failed to set aside their differences and unify since 1992.
Observers also understood that Metropolitan Filaret (Denysenko), who presided over the KP as patriarch from 1995 to 2018, would not easily relinquish the authority he enjoyed during his many decades of church presidency. Predictably enough, Filaret chafed at his reduced role as a permanent member of the OCU’s synod, even though the synod directed that he would remain the presiding bishop of the Kyivan eparchy. Filaret’s disapproval of the OCU and its leader, Metropolitan Epifaniy (Dumenko), escalated to such a degree that Filaret convoked an all-Ukrainian council on June 20, 2019, at St. Volodymyr Cathedral in Kyiv. While only two bishops besides Filaret participated, the council restored the KP. The council annulled the dissolution of the KP (from the unification council of December 15, 2018) and revived it, restoring Filaret as patriarch. Furthermore, the council decreed that the OCU was not truly autocephalous, but dependent upon the EP, and the bishops participating in the council ordained a new eparchial bishop for the KP.
How is one to interpret the most recent drama revolving around Ukrainian Orthodoxy? What motivated Filaret to disavow the tomos and revive the KP? Is this an omen for the OCU? Is there any hope for the realization of unity among Orthodox Ukrainians in light of this most recent fracture?
Filaret’s Legacy
Most Orthodox interested in world affairs know that Filaret is a lightning-rod figure. Outside of Ukraine, Filaret had a reputation as a strong-armed dictator within the Church who was allegedly married with children and abandoned the MP when he was not elected patriarch in 1989. In Ukraine, Filaret has been the most influential and powerful religious leader since the Cold War. He was appointed as exarch of the MP in Ukraine in 1966, bearing the special responsibility of maintaining the unity of a Church that had recently added Greek Catholics from Western Ukraine, against their will. Armed with knowledge of the Ukrainian language, Filaret’s tight control of the Church during the Soviet era was needed to keep Ukrainian dissenters in the fold.
When the Soviet regime loosened its restrictions on religious freedom, the ecclesial landscape in Ukraine shifted dramatically. Not only did the former Greek Catholics abandon the MP in 1989, but the autocephalous movement among the Orthodox also revived. Recognizing the relentless nature of the autocephalists, Filaret joined them in 1992, and quickly ascended to the highest office in 1995, presiding over the gradual growth of the KP while putting his organizational and governing skills to good use.
Filaret’s resilience in the milieu of formidable opposition altered his profile. He became the champion of Ukrainian autocephaly and a vocal critic of Putin and his policies, attaining the reputation as the father of Ukrainian autocephaly with no challenges to his position as the KP’s primate. Filaret’s connection to Ukrainian autocephaly clouded the history of the movement. He claimed credit for his advocacy of the cause, even though several of Filaret’s predecessors established the blueprint for Ukrainian autocephaly, and he merely joined a church that already had a patriarch (Mstyslav Skrypnyk, in 1992).
Filaret’s decision to renew the KP and disavow the tomos can only be understood in light of this context. In over fifty years of vast primatial power, Filaret has become accustomed to acting unilaterally. He simply could not accept that the baton of presidency had been handed from him to a much younger protégé (Epifaniy) who was open to reforming the Church, and Filaret’s handwriting was absent from the OCU’s tomos of autocephaly. While Filaret has complained about the OCU’s reception of chrism from the EP in the tomos, the fate of the small number of parishes outside of Ukraine rankled him most, because Filaret was a much-beloved hero among émigré Ukrainians in North America and Europe who refused to submit to the jurisdictional authority of the EP. Filaret fumed at the refusal of the sister Churches to formally recognize the OCU, thinking that the relinquishing of patriarchal status for the EP’s tomos had diminished the stature of the Ukrainian Church in the eyes of the world. Soon after the imparting of the tomos codified Ukrainian autocephaly, Filaret began to complain about Ukrainian dependence on Constantinople.
Readers will object at the absurdity of Filaret’s rejection of the EP. Not only had Filaret agreed to exchange patriarchal status for a metropolia in 2008, and again in 2016, but he was the primary beneficiary of the EP’s exercise of primacy in annulling the canonical sanctions imposed on him by the MP in 1992 and 1997. The rationale for his objections comes to light from the final outcome of the process of Ukrainian autocephaly: Filaret was no longer the unquestioned primate of the Church, but it seemed that the OCU – under the EP’s influence – had moved decisively away from the concept of a powerful primate who acts unilaterally. This philosophical shift not only kept Filaret from occupying the office of primate, but also signaled the end to his preferred style of Church leadership.
Frustrated by Epifaniy’s preference for governance via collegiality and the OCU synod’s refusal to declare itself a patriarchate, Filaret responded to this situation by acting as he always does: unilaterally. Confident that he still has the broad power originally given him in 1966, Filaret believes that Ukrainians will confirm his conviction that prestige produces legitimacy by forsaking the OCU for the newly-revived KP. This is the only way to make sense of his refrain that only patriarchates are truly autocephalous – in his mind, since he remains a patriarch, only he can guide the Church to the true independence that will demand the respect of the rest of the Orthodox world.
The OCU: Addition by subtraction?
On the surface, it seems that the revival of the KP will damage the OCU. To be sure, there are Ukrainians sympathetic to Filaret’s position, and he will continue to find candidates for ordination that will happily submit to his authority. But Filaret has miscalculated the resolve of the OCU to pursue its mission in the immediate post-tomos period. From its very inception, the goal of the Ukrainian autocephalous movement has been canonical recognition of its Orthodoxy by the sister Churches. A number of canonical and political impediments prevented the realization of this goal until the EP’s action in 2018-19. The process is now well underway, even though many years will elapse before universal recognition is achieved because of the complexities of inter-Orthodox relations.
The bishops and clergy of the OCU largely ignored Filaret’s recent appeals because most of them do not share his imperial mindset. Filaret connects ecclesial legitimacy to size, prestige, and power; the episcopate of the OCU is content with the EP’s tomos of autcephaly, even though the OCU is a metropolia, and not a patriarchate. By removing himself from the OCU, Filaret is paving the path for Metropolitan Epifaniy and his brothers in the OCU to pursue their mission without the distraction of power-grubbing. If Epifaniy proves himself to be truly collegial and works with the Church, as opposed to dictatorial unilateral decision-making, the revival of the KP could very well enhance the OCU’s chances for success as it executes Christ’s ministry in Ukraine.
Achieving Elusive Unity
Some insiders privately hope that Filaret’s withdrawal from the OCU might enable negotiations between the UOC-MP and OCU. While this is desirable, negotiation can take place only if all parties are willing to dialogue, and this is currently not the case. The endless debates on the validity of ordinations, the canonical territory of Ukraine, and the cults of personality associated with the Church’s leaders are all stealing time and energy away from the Church’s true apostolic work of evangelism, charity, and ministry, in Christ.
To be sure, there is a need for solid Orthodox Church diplomacy. Perhaps the Archbishop of Cyprus will contribute to the cooling of hot tempers and restore dialogue between the EP and MP. Much good could come from meetings between Ukrainian parishes outside of Ukraine and representatives of the EP: Constantinople needs to hear the appeal of parishes upon which canonical changes are merely imposed. In Ukraine, only good could come from the renewal of dialogue between the OCU and the UOC-MP.
As long as isolation supersedes dialogue, all Orthodox people will lose, and the “biggest losers” in the current scenario are the Ukrainian people, who are caught in the crossfire of an ugly, intra-Orthodox polemical war that continues to rage. While everyone claims to be on God’s side, only complete devotion to cultivating the Lord’s vineyard in Ukraine can validate that claim. The shepherds who forsake the prestige that comes with the power of the episcopal office and encourage their sheep to reconcile in the peace of Christ will be the ones who finally put an end to this unfortunate episode in the history of modern Orthodoxy. This is the final lesson imparted to us by Filaret’s legacy, the famous teaching of our Lord, Jesus Christ, that continues to pierce the hearts of Christians throughout the world: “whoever desires to be great among you shall be your servant. And whoever of you desires to be first shall be slave of all” (Mark 10:43b-44, NKJV). An authentic resurrection of Orthodox unity in Ukraine will take place when Church leaders finally die to their own ambitions for power and authority, for the sake of the faithful.
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Fr. Nicholas Denysenko is the Emil and Elfriede Jochum University Chair and Professor of Theology at Valparaiso University. He is an ordained deacon of the Orthodox Church in America.
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